U.S. lifts endorses on Venezuelan general who broke with Maduro
From Carrot to Coup: The U.S. Sanctions Pivot on Venezuela (2019‑2026)
In May 2019, the Trump administration made a calculated wager. For the first time, it would follow through on its promise to offer "exit ramps" to Venezuelan officials who abandoned Nicolás Maduro. The Treasury Department removed sanctions on General Manuel Ricardo Cristopher Figuera, the head of Venezuela's SEBIN intelligence service, after he broke with the regime and helped release opposition leader Leopoldo López from house arrest. Vice President Mike Pence announced the move with clear messaging: "We trust the activity that our country is taking today will urge others to pursue the case of General Cristopher Figuera." It was the opening of a new chapter in U.S. policy—a shift from sticks alone to carrots, designed to peel away the military support that propped up Maduro.[reference:0][reference:1]
Seven years later, that "carrot" strategy has been rendered almost unrecognizable by events. The man who was offered as a model for defection, General Figuera, spent weeks in hiding before fleeing to the United States, where he became a protected intelligence asset and revealed secrets about illegal gold trading, Hezbollah cells in Venezuelan cities, and Cuban influence over the regime.[reference:2] The opposition leader who was supposed to benefit from these defections, Juan Guaidó, saw his interim government dissolved by his own allies in 2026 after years of failing to dislodge Maduro.[reference:3] And the ultimate outcome—Maduro's removal—came not through defections or diplomacy, but through a U.S. military operation that seized him in Caracas in January 2026, replacing him with his own vice president, Delcy Rodríguez, who now enjoys a rapidly warming relationship with Washington.[reference:4][reference:5] This is the story of how a policy built on incremental pressure and incentives gave way to a dramatic, and deeply controversial, transformation of U.S.-Venezuela relations.
📋 The 2019 Starting Point: A General's Defection and a Failed Uprising
The original 2019 article on this site captured the immediate aftermath of the April 30 uprising led by Juan Guaidó. That day, a small group of armed forces joined Guaidó's mass demonstration, and Leopoldo López—who had been under house arrest—was freed in an operation facilitated by Figuera's agents.[reference:6] But the uprising fizzled. Maduro remained in power, and his security forces quickly reasserted control. Figuera, whose whereabouts were unknown at the time, was accused by Maduro of being a "traitor, mole and infiltrator" captured by the CIA a year earlier.[reference:7]
The U.S. response was to double down on its dual-track strategy. On one hand, it continued to tighten the economic noose: more than 150 Venezuelan officials and companies had already been sanctioned, and the administration was preparing to sanction the 25 remaining members of the pro-Maduro Supreme Court.[reference:8][reference:9] On the other, it offered carrots: the USNS Comfort hospital ship was deployed to the region, and Pence pledged that once Maduro left, the U.S. would work with other nations to provide trade finance and credit to rebuild Venezuela.[reference:10]
The lifting of sanctions on Figuera was the centerpiece of this carrot strategy. By removing him from the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) list, the U.S. allowed him to access any blocked assets and conduct business with American individuals, companies, and banks.[reference:11] The hope was that other military figures would follow. They did not—at least, not in sufficient numbers to topple the regime.
💡 Analyst Perspective: The Limits of Carrots
The Figuera case revealed both the potential and the limits of sanctions relief as an incentive for defection. One general took the exit ramp. But the broader military command structure remained intact, bound by loyalty, fear, and the lucrative spoils of the Maduro regime's illicit networks. The U.S. would spend the next seven years oscillating between maximum pressure and targeted incentives, never finding the formula that could peacefully dislodge Maduro. In the end, it abandoned the incremental approach entirely.
🕵️ Figuera's Journey: From Hiding to U.S. Intelligence Asset
For months after the April 30 uprising, General Figuera's whereabouts remained a mystery. Maduro's government had charged him with conspiracy and treason, and he had disappeared from public view. Then, in early 2026, it was revealed that Figuera had spent two months in hiding before escaping to the United States, where he became a protected intelligence asset.[reference:12]
In his first interviews with American media, Figuera—who remains a self-described "Chavista" at heart, having served for a decade as Hugo Chávez's head of security—made explosive allegations. He accused the Venezuelan government of involvement in illegal gold trading. He claimed that Hezbollah cells were operating in cities including Maracay and Caracas. And he detailed the pervasive influence of Cuba over Maduro's decision-making.[reference:13]
As of 2026, Figuera remains in the United States. The exact location of his residence is not publicly disclosed, but he is presumed to be under U.S. government protection. His defection, once touted as a model for others, has instead become a singular case—a high-value intelligence asset whose information has been used to build legal and political cases against the regime, but not a catalyst for the mass defections the Trump administration had hoped for.
📉 The Fall of Guaidó's Interim Government: A Strategy That Faded
When Figuera defected in 2019, Juan Guaidó was at the peak of his international recognition. Dozens of countries, including the United States, had recognized him as Venezuela's legitimate interim president. The strategy was to use a combination of diplomatic isolation, economic sanctions, and military pressure to force Maduro from office and install Guaidó as the leader of a transitional government.
Seven years later, that strategy lies in ruins. In April 2026, three of the four major parties in the Venezuelan opposition voted to dissolve the "interim government" led by Guaidó. The move was a formal acknowledgment of what had been obvious for years: Guaidó's claim to the presidency had failed to translate into actual power, and the international support that once buoyed him had eroded as the U.S. and other nations began exploring alternative paths.[reference:14]
Guaidó himself remains active, presenting a government plan in early 2026 that focused on "recuperar el Estado" (recovering the state), empowering citizens, and reintegrating Venezuela into the world.[reference:15] But his political relevance has diminished. The U.S., which once championed him as the legitimate president, has pivoted to engaging directly with Delcy Rodríguez, a former Maduro loyalist who now leads the country.
💡 Analyst Perspective: The Guaidó Experiment's Lessons
The failure of the Guaidó interim government offers a sobering lesson in the limits of external recognition as a tool for regime change. International legitimacy, without control over state institutions—especially the military and the security services—proved hollow. The U.S. and its allies invested heavily in the Guaidó project, but it could not overcome the fundamental reality that Maduro retained the loyalty of the armed forces and the repressive apparatus of the state. In 2026, Washington has abandoned the recognition strategy entirely, opting instead for direct engagement with the very regime it once sought to overthrow.
💥 The 2026 Earthquake: Operation Absolute Resolve and Maduro's Removal
On January 3, 2026, the landscape of Venezuelan politics was shattered by a U.S. military operation code-named "Operation Absolute Resolve." American forces seized Nicolás Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores, in a raid on Caracas and transported them to New York to face drug trafficking charges.[reference:16][reference:17] The operation, which the Trump administration had long hinted at but never executed, fundamentally altered the balance of power in Venezuela.
In the immediate aftermath, Delcy Rodríguez—who had served as Maduro's vice president and was herself sanctioned by the U.S. in 2018—was sworn in as interim president by the Maduro-dominated National Assembly.[reference:18] She moved quickly to consolidate power, liberalize the economy, and open the country to U.S. investment. President Trump praised her as "a terrific person" and "doing a great job."[reference:19]
The U.S. response was a dramatic reversal of its sanctions policy. On April 1, 2026, the Treasury Department removed Rodríguez from the SDN list, allowing her to conduct business with U.S. companies and potentially meet with Trump.[reference:20] On April 15, the U.S. lifted sanctions on Venezuela's Central Bank and three other state-owned banking institutions—the most significant easing of the punitive regime since 2017. Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent publicly endorsed the IMF's efforts to reintegrate Venezuela into the international financial system.[reference:21]
🏛️ The New Venezuelan Landscape: Economic Liberalization and Political Stagnation
Under Rodríguez's leadership, Venezuela has moved rapidly to liberalize its economy and attract foreign capital. In January 2026, the National Assembly passed legislation opening the oil sector to private investment, reversing the nationalizations that Chávez implemented in the mid-2000s.[reference:22] Chevron has signed an agreement to expand production in the Orinoco Belt, and the U.S. has authorized the sale of Venezuelan gold in American markets.[reference:23]
Rodríguez's government is also preparing to take over the boards of PDVSA's U.S. subsidiaries, including Citgo Petroleum, which has been run since 2019 by supervising boards appointed by the now-defunct opposition-led congress.[reference:24] This would give the Rodríguez government control over one of Venezuela's most valuable foreign assets.
But the political transformation has been far less complete. Rodríguez has left Maduro's repressive government largely intact, and has ceded little political control. Hundreds of political prisoners remain in Venezuelan jails, despite an amnesty law passed by the National Assembly. Foro Penal, a prisoners' rights group, estimates that almost 500 political prisoners are still detained.[reference:25]
Opposition leader María Corina Machado, who was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in December 2025, met with Secretary of State Marco Rubio in April 2026. Rubio insisted that "there will have to be free and fair elections in Venezuela, and that point has to come," but offered no timeline.[reference:26][reference:27] For now, the U.S. appears content to prioritize economic access and stability over democratic transition.
💡 Analyst Perspective: Oil Trumps Democracy
The Trump administration's rapid embrace of Delcy Rodríguez—a longtime Maduro insider—reveals the enduring primacy of economic and geopolitical interests over democracy promotion. Access to Venezuela's vast oil reserves, critical minerals, and gold has driven the normalization of relations. The opposition, which the U.S. once championed, has been sidelined. The lesson of the past seven years is clear: when push comes to shove, the United States will prioritize a stable, cooperative partner—even an authoritarian one—over a protracted, uncertain democratic transition.
⚖️ The Role of Sanctions: A Reassessment
The lifting of sanctions on Figuera in 2019 was a small, targeted exception to a broader maximum pressure campaign. The lifting of sanctions on Rodríguez and the Central Bank in 2026 represents a wholesale dismantling of that campaign. The journey from one to the other reflects a fundamental reassessment of what sanctions can and cannot achieve.
Proponents of the maximum pressure strategy argued that economic strangulation would eventually force Maduro from office. Critics contended that sanctions primarily immiserated the Venezuelan population while leaving the regime's elite largely untouched. The outcome in 2026 suggests a more complex reality: sanctions alone did not topple Maduro—a military operation did. But sanctions did create the conditions of economic desperation that made the regime vulnerable to internal defections and external intervention.
Now, with Maduro removed, the U.S. is racing to unwind the very sanctions architecture it spent years constructing. The Treasury Department's general licenses now authorize a broad range of financial operations with the Central Bank of Venezuela, Banco de Venezuela, and other state-owned institutions. Correspondent banks, payment processors, and remittance platforms based in the United States can, for the first time in nearly a decade, serve Venezuelan institutions without violating sanctions.[reference:28]
The full lifting of sanctions, however, is not yet complete. The OFAC licenses specify that they do not authorize the unblocking of frozen assets, and individual sanctions against officials designated for corruption or drug trafficking remain in force. But the trajectory is clear: the U.S. is moving toward full normalization of economic relations with Venezuela, driven by the strategic imperative of securing access to the country's energy and mineral resources.
📊 U.S.-Venezuela Sanctions Policy: 2019 vs. 2026
| Metric | 2019 (Figuera Defection) | 2026 (Current Reality) |
|---|---|---|
| U.S. Policy Framework | Maximum pressure + targeted carrots for defectors | Full normalization with interim government; sanctions unwinding |
| Venezuelan Leader | Nicolás Maduro (U.S. sought his removal) | Delcy Rodríguez (acting president; former Maduro VP) |
| Opposition Figure | Juan Guaidó (recognized as interim president by U.S.) | Guaidó's interim government dissolved; María Corina Machado sidelined |
| Sanctions on Leadership | Maduro and inner circle sanctioned; Figuera removed as incentive | Rodríguez removed from SDN list; Central Bank sanctions lifted |
| General Figuera Status | Defected; whereabouts unknown; U.S. lifted sanctions | In U.S. under protection; revealed regime secrets |
| Oil Sector | Under heavy sanctions; PDVSA isolated | Chevron expanding; PDVSA subsidiaries returning to government control |
| Diplomatic Relations | U.S. embassy closed; Guaidó's envoys recognized | U.S. embassy reopened; Rodríguez's envoys dispatched to Washington |
| Political Prisoners | Thousands detained; López under house arrest | ~500 remain detained despite amnesty law |
📋 The Bottom Line: Key Takeaways for 2026
🥕 The 2019 Carrot Strategy Yielded Only One Major Defector: General Manuel Cristopher Figuera took the exit ramp offered by the Trump administration, but the mass defections that U.S. officials hoped for never materialized. Figuera became a valuable intelligence asset, not a catalyst for regime change.
📉 The Guaidó Interim Government Failed: Despite years of international recognition and diplomatic support, Juan Guaidó's claim to the presidency never translated into actual power. His own allies dissolved the interim government in 2026, acknowledging the failure of the strategy.
💥 Maduro Was Removed by Force, Not Diplomacy: Operation Absolute Resolve, a U.S. military raid in January 2026, achieved what years of sanctions and diplomacy could not: the physical removal of Nicolás Maduro from Venezuela.
🔄 Delcy Rodríguez Has Consolidated Power: Maduro's former vice president, herself a sanctioned official, now leads Venezuela as acting president. She has moved rapidly to liberalize the economy and open the country to U.S. investment.
💰 The U.S. Is Unwinding Its Sanctions Architecture: In a stunning policy reversal, the Trump administration has lifted sanctions on Rodríguez, the Central Bank, and major state-owned banks. The U.S. is backing Venezuela's reintegration into the IMF and global financial system.
⚖️ Economic Access Trumps Democracy Promotion: The rapid normalization of relations with the Rodríguez government, despite its authoritarian character and continued detention of political prisoners, demonstrates that U.S. strategic and economic interests have eclipsed the democracy agenda.
🔮 The Future Remains Uncertain: While economic liberalization is accelerating, the political transition is stalled. Free elections remain a distant promise, and the opposition has been marginalized. The long-term stability of the new arrangement depends on whether Rodríguez can deliver economic recovery without meaningful democratic reform.
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