South Africa's ANC tries to turn around sliding help in extreme decision
From Wake‑Up Call to Coalition Crisis: The ANC's Seven‑Year Battle for Survival (2019‑2026)
In May 2019, the African National Congress faced its hardest constituent test in a generation. Voters baffled by corruption and racial imbalances lined up at polling stations across South Africa, many with a single message for the party that had ruled since the end of apartheid. "I'm an individual from the ANC however I didn't vote in favor of them this time," said development specialist Thabo Makhene, 32, in Johannesburg. "They have to get a wake‑up. The manner in which they run the state, misusing state reserves, they've lost their ethics." Pete Mokokosi, a 77‑year‑old beneficiary, echoed the sentiment: "The climate changes ordinary, for what reason wouldn't we be able to."
The 2019 election was the first under President Cyril Ramaphosa, who had supplanted the scandal‑tormented Jacob Zuma just over a year earlier. The ANC won 57.5% of the vote—down from 62% in 2014—and analysts warned that a "less than impressive display" would encourage Ramaphosa's rivals and risk a potential leadership challenge. Razia Khan, chief Africa market analyst at Standard Chartered, captured the mood: Ramaphosa had promised to improve service delivery, create jobs, and fight corruption, but his reforms were held up by divisions and resistance inside his own party. "Changes will stay, best case scenario one‑advance forward‑one‑advance back," warned Peter Attard Montalto of Intellidex.
Seven years later, the wake‑up call that Thabo Makhene demanded has arrived—but not in the form the ANC hoped. The party has lost its parliamentary majority for the first time since 1994, forced into an uneasy Government of National Unity with its longtime rival, the Democratic Alliance. Load shedding has receded, but corruption perceptions remain stubbornly high. And as the 2026 local elections loom, the ANC is fighting for its political life, with its tripartite alliance partner, the South African Communist Party, breaking ranks to contest independently. This is the story of how the ANC's slide from dominance became a crisis of survival.
📋 The 2019 Starting Point: A Weakened Mandate and a Divided Party
The original 2019 article on this site captured the ANC at a precarious moment. The party had won 57.5% of the national vote—its worst performance since coming to power in 1994—and had lost ground in key urban areas. The Democratic Alliance (DA) and the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF) were both growing, and the shadow of Jacob Zuma's state capture era hung heavily over the political landscape. Ramaphosa, who had narrowly defeated a faction aligned with Zuma to become ANC leader, promised a "New Dawn" of clean governance, economic revival, and party renewal.
But the promise was easier made than kept. The economy grew an estimated 0.8% in 2018, having barely recovered from a recession driven by drought and the chronic power outages at Eskom. Unemployment was among the highest in the world, and the ANC's internal divisions—between the reformist Ramaphosa camp and the populist, Zuma‑aligned faction—paralyzed decision‑making. As Montalto warned, the result was a "one‑step‑forward‑one‑step‑back" dynamic that frustrated investors and voters alike.
💡 Analyst Perspective: The ANC's Two Wars
In 2019, the ANC was fighting two wars simultaneously. The first was external—the battle to retain the trust of an electorate exhausted by corruption, unemployment, and crumbling infrastructure. The second was internal—the factional struggle between Ramaphosa's reformers and the Zuma‑era network that remained embedded in the party's structures and the state. The tragedy for the ANC is that it never fully won either war. It lost the external battle in 2024, and the internal war is still raging, with the anti‑GNU faction now threatening to unravel the coalition that keeps Ramaphosa in power.
💥 The 2024 Electoral Earthquake: The ANC Loses Its Majority
If 2019 was a warning, 2024 was the reckoning. On May 29, South Africans went to the polls and delivered a devastating verdict on three decades of ANC rule. The party secured just 40.1% of the national vote, down from 57.5% in 2019. In parliamentary terms, the ANC's seat count collapsed from 230 to 159—far short of the 201 seats needed for a majority.[reference:0][reference:1] For the first time since the end of apartheid, the ANC could not govern alone.
The results reflected a fragmented political landscape. The DA retained its position as the official opposition with 87 seats, while former president Jacob Zuma's newly formed uMkhonto we Sizwe (MK) Party surged to 58 seats—overtaking the EFF's 39.[reference:2] The voter turnout fell to 58.6%, down from 66% in 2019, a sign of growing disillusionment with the entire political class.[reference:3]
The provincial results were equally sobering for the ANC. In Gauteng, the economic heartland, the party dropped to 28 seats in the provincial legislature, while the DA held 22 and the EFF 11. In KwaZulu‑Natal, Zuma's stronghold, the MK Party won a staggering 37 seats, reducing the ANC to just 14—a humiliation in a province the ANC had dominated for decades.[reference:4] The message from the electorate was clear: the ANC's moral authority, built on the legacy of Nelson Mandela and the liberation struggle, had been exhausted.
🤝 The Government of National Unity: A Coalition of Necessity
In the weeks following the election, South Africa entered uncharted territory. The ANC scrambled to find coalition partners to form a government. After nearly a month of intense negotiations, ten parties—led by the ANC and including the DA, Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), Patriotic Alliance (PA), GOOD Party, and others—formed a Government of National Unity (GNU).[reference:5] The DA, which had spent decades as the ANC's fiercest critic, now sat in cabinet, with its leader John Steenhuisen serving as Minister of Agriculture.
The GNU was a marriage of convenience, not conviction. Ramaphosa's aim was to restore investor confidence, rebuild state institutions, and grow the economy after years of state capture. The markets responded positively: the rand strengthened, and South Africa's credit rating was upgraded by S&P for the first time in over a decade. But the coalition was fragile from the start, with deep ideological divisions between the ANC and the DA, and with a powerful faction inside the ANC itself opposed to the partnership.
Fikile Mbalula, the ANC's secretary‑general, described the GNU as a "temporary arrangement."[reference:6] The ANC's internal document, signed by Mbalula and DA federal chairperson Helen Zille, pledged the parties to "cooperate through a voluntary GNU"—wording that hinted at the transactional nature of the alliance.[reference:7] As one analyst put it, "the grandly named Government of National Unity" was born not of shared vision, but of parliamentary arithmetic.[reference:8]
💡 Analyst Perspective: The DA's Gamble
For the DA, entering the GNU was a high‑stakes gamble. The party had long positioned itself as the principled opposition to ANC corruption and maladministration. By joining the government, it risked being tainted by the very failures it had spent years criticizing. Yet the alternative—remaining in opposition while the ANC governed with the EFF or MK Party—was arguably worse. The DA's calculation was that it could influence policy from within, demonstrate its capacity to govern, and hold the ANC accountable while sharing power. Whether that gamble pays off will be tested in the 2026 local elections.
🔄 Ramaphosa's Renewal: Promises vs. Reality
Cyril Ramaphosa's "New Dawn" was built on three pillars: clean governance, economic revival, and party renewal. Seven years after he took office, the record is mixed at best. On the positive side, the economy has shown signs of life. South Africa grew for four consecutive quarters through Q3 2025, and the country was removed from the FATF grey list in 2025 following consistent efforts from financial governance structures.[reference:9][reference:10] The end of load shedding—which had crippled the economy for years—has been the single most significant achievement of the post‑2019 period.
But on corruption, the picture is bleak. South Africa's score on Transparency International's Corruption Perceptions Index remains stuck at 41 out of 100—unchanged from the previous year and below the global average of 42.[reference:11] Corruption Watch executive director Lebogang Ramafoko warned that "the dip over the past two years to 41 is certainly cause for concern as it suggests that corruption is not being taken seriously enough by our leaders."[reference:12]
The Zondo Commission of Inquiry into State Capture, which sat for 400 days and heard over 300 witnesses, produced a mountain of evidence—1.7 million pages of documents and 1 petabyte of digital evidence.[reference:13] Of its 218 recommendations for criminal investigation, only ten cases have been finalized with a verdict, and just one person has been imprisoned.[reference:14][reference:15] Raymond Zondo, the former chief justice who led the commission, has publicly criticized Ramaphosa for appointing politicians to his cabinet who were implicated by the commission's findings.[reference:16]
Ramaphosa himself has acknowledged the failure. At the ANC's 114th anniversary celebration in March 2026, he declared the party's renewal programme "imperative" to its survival, warning that "failure to rebuild and reconnect with citizens will further erode public trust." He called on members to unite behind renewal and prioritize the needs of the people above internal interests. "Our people expect decisive leadership that delivers real results," he said.[reference:17] But as one analyst put it, "Cyril is only going to be better than Zuma, but will still fail, as he falls short of the minimum requirements for ANC renewal."[reference:18]
💡 The End of Load Shedding: A Rare Victory
If there is one area where the ANC can claim genuine progress, it is Eskom. For years, rolling blackouts crippled the economy and symbolized the state's failure. In 2022‑2023, load shedding reached its worst levels, with some areas without power for up to 12 hours a day. Yet by 2025, the situation had transformed. Eskom last implemented national load shedding on May 15, 2025, and as of April 2026, South Africa has gone 341 consecutive days without a single load shedding event.[reference:19][reference:20]
The improvement came from a combination of factors: better maintenance, reduced unplanned outages, and a surge in private power generation. Eskom's Energy Availability Factor climbed from 54.55% in FY2023 to approximately 65.35% in FY2026, exceeding 70% on more than 83 occasions.[reference:21] Diesel costs dropped by R26.9 billion compared to FY2023, and the utility now reports a surplus of about 6 gigawatts above what the country needs.[reference:22][reference:23] Standard & Poor's upgraded Eskom's credit rating for the first time in over a decade.[reference:24]
Yet even this good news is fragile. Eskom warns that a supply crunch between 2029 and 2030 is possible if new generation capacity is not built fast enough—requiring approximately 10.3GW of solar, 7.4GW of wind, and 6GW of gas by 2030.[reference:25] The end of load shedding is a genuine achievement, but it is a reprieve, not a cure.
🗳️ The 2026 Local Elections: The Next Test
As of April 2026, the ANC is in full campaign mode for the local government elections, which will be the first electoral test since the 2024 debacle. President Ramaphosa has introduced a comprehensive action plan aimed at revitalizing ANC‑led municipalities, focusing on service delivery, accountability, and the removal of underperforming mayors.[reference:26][reference:27]
The ANC has also taken the unusual step of allowing communities to propose mayoral candidates and plans to "headhunt" capable individuals—a tacit admission that the party's traditional candidate selection processes have failed to produce competent leaders. "We are running an ANC‑led election campaign, not personalities," said secretary‑general Fikile Mbalula.[reference:28][reference:29]
Complicating the ANC's efforts is a major rupture in its tripartite alliance. The South African Communist Party (SACP), a struggle‑era ally that has long contested elections under the ANC umbrella, has decided to run independently in the 2026 local elections. "It's final and the doubt has been swept away – the ANC and its struggle‑era ally, the SACP, will not contest the upcoming local government elections as a united force."[reference:30] The split reflects the SACP's frustration with the ANC's drift and its embrace of the DA in the GNU.
Analysts are pessimistic about the ANC's prospects. "The ANC will not bounce back because eligible voters are mostly affected by service delivery failures and are fed up," one governance expert warned.[reference:31] With the SACP now a competitor, the DA seeking to capitalize on its GNU role, and the MK Party and EFF fighting for the same disaffected voters, the local elections could deliver another blow to the ANC's already weakened position.
⚔️ The Internal Divisions: Ramaphosa's Enemies Within
The ANC's greatest threat may not be the DA, the MK Party, or the EFF—it may be itself. A powerful anti‑GNU faction inside the party is gaining ground and could destabilize national politics before the 2027 ANC elective conference.[reference:32] This group, which includes figures aligned with Deputy President Paul Mashatile, wants to move the party away from its partnership with the DA and toward a new alliance with the EFF and the MK Party.
Recent developments in Gauteng show this shift is no longer just talk. Premier Panyaza Lesufi has brought the EFF into the provincial government, appointing the party's Gauteng chairperson Nkululeko Dunga as finance MEC. Talks are also under way to bring in the MK Party, which would further strengthen a left‑leaning coalition that excludes the DA entirely.[reference:33]
Deputy President Mashatile has openly supported this approach, saying the party is willing to work with any group that wants to "save South Africa." His comments suggest that if he becomes party leader in 2027, he could push for a major political realignment that would dismantle the GNU and replace it with a populist alliance.[reference:34]
The DA has made clear it will not stay in any government that includes the EFF or the MK Party. If the DA were to leave, the current unity government would lose its majority in Parliament, creating uncertainty at a time when the country is trying to rebuild its economy.[reference:35] The rand, which strengthened on news of the GNU, could weaken again, increasing borrowing costs and slowing economic recovery.[reference:36]
📊 The ANC: 2019 vs. 2026
| Aspect | 2019 (First Ramaphosa Election) | 2026 (Current Reality) |
|---|---|---|
| National Vote Share | 57.5% (won majority) | 40.1% in 2024 (lost majority) |
| Parliamentary Seats | 230 of 400 | 159 of 400 (in GNU with DA and others) |
| Party Leader | Cyril Ramaphosa (post‑Zuma) | Cyril Ramaphosa (not seeking third term in 2027) |
| Main Opponents | DA (22%), EFF (11%) | DA (87 seats), MK Party (58 seats), EFF (39 seats) |
| Load Shedding | Chronic; symbol of state failure | Ended; 341 days without load shedding as of April 2026 |
| Corruption Perception Score | ~43‑44 (2019) | 41 out of 100 (2025); below global average |
| State Capture Accountability | Zondo Commission ongoing | One person imprisoned; Zondo criticizes lack of progress |
| Tripartite Alliance | ANC, SACP, COSATU united | SACP contesting 2026 local elections independently |
📋 The Bottom Line: Key Takeaways for 2026
📉 The 2019 Wake‑Up Call Was Not Heeded: Thabo Makhene's demand that the ANC "get a wake‑up" was prophetic. The party did not reform in time, and in 2024 it lost its parliamentary majority for the first time in three decades.
🤝 The GNU Is a Fragile Marriage of Convenience: The ANC‑DA coalition was born of necessity, not shared vision. A powerful faction inside the ANC wants to replace it with an alliance with the EFF and MK Party—a move that could destabilize the government and the economy.
💡 Load Shedding Has Ended—For Now: Eskom's turnaround is the ANC's most tangible success. But the reprieve is fragile, and a supply crunch looms if new generation capacity is not built quickly.
⚖️ Corruption Perceptions Remain Stubbornly High: Despite the Zondo Commission's exhaustive work, South Africa's corruption score is stuck at 41—below the global average. Only one person has been imprisoned for state capture.
🗳️ The 2026 Local Elections Are the Next Test: The ANC faces a difficult contest, with the SACP running independently and voters fed up with service delivery failures. The results will shape the narrative ahead of the 2027 ANC conference.
⚔️ The ANC's Greatest Enemy Is Itself: The factional war between Ramaphosa's reformers and Mashatile's populists will determine the party's future. The 2027 elective conference is the decisive battleground.
🔮 The Future Is Uncertain: The ANC's slide from dominance is not yet a fall from power, but it is a crisis of legitimacy. Whether the party can renew itself—or whether it will be consumed by its internal contradictions—remains the central question of South African politics.
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